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Shakespeare’s poetry in action:
between thought and passion
La poésie de Shakespeare en action : entre pensée et passion
Alessandro Serpieri
1 Drawing from my experience both as a critic and as a translator, I will investigate some of
Shakespeare’s distinctive ways of creating poetry in action: that is, poetry that develops
on stage – and therefore is endowed with a performative power – and poetry that grows
out of a dialectics between passion and thought. Whether the text is a play or a narrative
poem, or a sonnet – though in the latter cases by using different modes of expression –,
Shakespeare’s poetry always conveys the process of minds “in situation”. As Coleridge
brilliantly noted, Shakespeare goes on evolving a line of thought and passion out of, or in
combination with, at least another one:
In  Shakspeare  one  sentence  begets  the  next  naturally;  the  meaning  is  all
interwoven.  He goes on kindling like  a  meteor through the dark atmosphere […]
Shakspeare’s intellectual action is wholly unlike that of Ben Jonson or Beaumont
and Fletcher. The latter see the totality of a sentence or passage, and then project it
entire. Shakspeare goes on creating, and evolving B. out of A., and C. out of B., and
so on, just as a serpent moves, which makes a fulcrum of its own body, and seems for
ever twisting and untwisting its own strength.1 (my italics)
2 In his many lectures on Shakespeare, as well as in his reported notes, while accounting
for  the  overall  meaning  and  structure  of  his  plays,  Coleridge  devoted  the  subtlest
analyses to his dramatic language. In the quoted passage, he summarizes in two pregnant
images his critical discourse on Shakespeare’s ingeniousness as one which begets new
expressions from previous expressions and intertwines them in co-occurring semantic
and/or figurative isotopies.2 It is an imagination in action in that it does not follow a linear
progression  of  meaning,  but  rather  develops  according  to  a  serpentine,  dynamic
movement that produces sense both expanding the previous one and contracting it in
order to release new unexpected sense. The dramatic discourse unfolds itself according to
the circumstantial standpoints of characters who, at the same time, think, feel and act.
The lyrical discourse, on the other hand, is that of a voice which creates its own dramatic
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movement and does so in relation to other persons or entities involved in either specific
or universal situations. 
3 Such a mobile, restless, and inventive, imagination often forces language to new modes of
expression, in terms both of neologisms and of original syntactical constructs, and thus
provides an endless hermeneutic challenge for critics and translators. 
4 I can consider here only a few examples of Shakespeare’s poetry in action, and I will
group them into three main categories: 
5 1. a character’s gradual discovery of his own thoughts and passions in  the process of
speech (the examples will be taken from Macbeth and The Winter’s Tale);
6 2.  a  character’s  transmission of  his  thoughts  and passions  to  another  character  (the
passages I will refer to are from Iago’s temptation of Othello); 
7 3. the poet, or the voice of the enunciation, gradually discovering his own thoughts and
passions (a few sonnets will thereby be discussed). 
8 In all these categories the discourse relies on an essentially dialogic procedure, which is
internalized in the mind of one character in 1. and 3., albeit from different standpoints
since it is indirectly addressed to different receivers (respectively, the audience in the
theatre, and the reader on the page); in 2., on the contrary, it develops the stage action
concerning the (il-)locutionary acts of two or more characters. 
9 1. Interpreting, and translating, Shakespeare is always a very hard task, but it is all the
more so in some plays,  particularly the later ones, where elocution may verge on an
apparent implosion of meaning. In such cases the characters’ discourse proves extremely
tortuous,  semantically ambiguous,  intricate and fragmented to the point  of  sounding
almost inaccessible. In the later plays, as Frank Kermode has noted, illocution expresses
“a turbulent thinking, so different from plainly formulated thought, set out clearly and
reinforced by elaborately illustrative and copious comparisons”3. This kind of illocution is
functional to “the representation of excited, anxious thought; the weighing of confused
possibilities and dubious motives; the proposing of a theory or explanation followed at
once by its abandonment or qualification, as in the meditation of a person under stress to
whom all that he is considering can be a prelude to vital choices, emotional and political”4
. 
10 In the same regard, Keir Elam has coined the definition of a rhetoric of inelocutio with
reference to Macbeth and other later plays, when 
the whole system of elocution suddenly implodes or self-destructs in advocating
modes  of  discursive  disintegration,  fragmentation,  hesitation,  reticence,
compression and opacity. The simulacrum, or simulatio, of the struggling speaker
about to lose control of his own discourse, and perhaps of his thought processes,
under the pressure of passion, is perhaps the highest achievement to which the
rhetoric of pathos through ethos can aspire, since there is nothing so delicate and
so difficult to get away with as an artfully constructed artlessness.5
11 Shakespeare’s  elocution,  when  entrusted  –  in  Kermode’s  words  –  with  “elaborately
illustrative and copious comparisons”,  may develop its meaning and its rhetoric in a
sinuous, and yet transparent, way. This can be seen, for instance, in Bassanio’s speech to
Portia (The Merchant of Venice, III.ii.88-101), when he is about to make his choice of the
right casket and is brought to use a complimentary ornamental discourse by which he
wants to exhibit his distrust of shows and to capture the approval of the lady: 
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…Look on beauty
And you shall see ‘tis purchased by the weight,
Which therein works a miracle in nature,
Making them lightest that wear most of it.
So are those crispèd, snaky, golden locks
Which makes such wanton gambols with the wind
Upon supposèd fairness, often known
To be the dowry of a second head,
The skull that bred them in the sepulchre.
Thus ornament is but the guilèd shore
To a most dangerous sea, the beauteous scarf
Veiling an Indian beauty; in a word,
The seeming truth which cunning times put on
To entrap the wisest. 
12 On other occasions, elocution can be artfully opaque and almost inaccessible, its purpose
being that of exposing a character’s personality and style. Let’s take just one example,
from  Hamlet,  I.iii.126-31,  where  Polonius  dissuades  Ophelia  from  continuing  her
relationship with the prince:
Do not believe his vows; for they are brokers 
Not of that dye which their investments show, 
But mere implorators of unholy suits, 
Breathing like sanctified and pious bawds 
The better to beguile. 
13 In his typically obscure and tortuous syntax and semantics, Polonius here conveys several
lines of meaning which can hardly be grasped in full by Ophelia and by the audience. The
pluriisotopy of these lines springs from the initial brokers, which, as has been noted by
Nigel Alexander, 
may be of three kinds and Polonius unites all three functions in this complex series
of images: a) dealers in finance who are not of the true colour or appearance (dye)
which their authorising documents (investments) indicate but simply solicitors for
improper requests who talk as if their proposals were holy and religious in order to
deceive their victims; b) go-betweens in matters of love who are not of the kind of
men claimed by the garments they have borrowed (from the church) but simply
makers of lewd and immoral suggestions who talk the language of marriage vows in
order to deceive their victims, c) dealers in old clothes – though this meaning is less
fully worked out.
14 Alexander thus concludes:  “Hamlet is thus a shady financier,  a pander who promises
marriage,  and an old clothes man.”6 Three isotopies,  developing from three different
agents, continually overlap, so that all key words sound equivocal, open to more than one
meaning. The ambiguous image of Hamlet as false wooer of Ophelia springs especially
from Polonius’  ingenious  use  of  the  following  terms:  investments (at  the  same  time,
financial  documents,  garments  of  go-betweens,  second-hand  clothes),  implorators
(solicitors and entreaters), unholy suits (prophane procedures and improper mediations),
bonds (contractual obligations and marriage vows and warranties). It is a difficult passage
to understand and to translate, but it does not contain any urgent emotion at work.
15 Quite different is the case of elocution expressing a problematic thinking through passion.
This  is  apparent  especially  in  the  later  plays,  where  elocution  repeatedly  verges  on
inelocution, due to the anxiety of the speaker, whose interior discourse disbands rather
than flowing,  compresses  its  meanings,  breaks up,  and often forces  language to new
modes  of  expression.  Here  Shakespeare’s  dramatic  poetry  resides  in  disturbed  inner
Shakespeare’s poetry in action: between thought and passion
Actes des congrès de la Société française Shakespeare, 24 | 2007
3
dialogues, in which a character gropes for a response to a vital question. Due to lack of
space, I can only hint at just a couple of passages from Macbeth and from The Winter’s Tale,
where the main character’s passion is at its pitch.
16 At the beginning of the seventh scene of the first Act, Macbeth copes with an ontological
question: 
If it were done when ’tis done, then ’twere well
It were done quickly. If th’assassination
Could trammel up the consequence, and catch
With his surcease success; that but this blow
Might be the be-all and the end-all, here,
But here upon this bank and shoal of time,
We’d jump the life to come…
17 His convulsive meditation turns on doing and being,  that is  to say on the ontological
question of the effectiveness of acting in time in order to achieve being in time. In his
frantic reasoning, Macbeth shows how keenly aware he is of the set-back that lies at the
basis of his, and his wife’s, intention to achieve power and be the power by violating,
through the murder of the sacred king, the very symbolic framework which grants being.
The extreme difficulty of his choice is expressed by the inextricable knot of temporal
planes – the future (If it were done) after the future of the imminent proposed regicide (
when ‘tis done), and the hypothetical present of that decision (then ’twere well) – and is
confirmed by the following suspended hypothesis, “If th’assassination / Could trammel
up the consequence,” where the new verbal phrase trammel up is produced in order to
signify the impossible target at which Macbeth is aiming. A target which, again, finds its
formula in two other neologisms: “the be-all and the end-all.” Macbeth’s vexation – here,
before the action, and then throughout the play as an outcome of the inconsequentiality
of his action – is that of not being able to push doing to the point of achieving being: being
king for all his life, past the risk of the indefinite becoming (that is acting).7 It is not by
chance that, once king, he will feel compelled by his fear to act endlessly and ruthfully as
if he wanted to annul or to anticipate any future time, while his previously determined
wife leaves the stage up to the moment of her nocturnal delirium.8 
18 Macbeth’s soliloquy goes on recalling the “double trust” which should protect Duncan,
since he is both his kinsman and his subject. At this point, several images are deployed
and overlapped in convulsive lines:
…Besides, this Duncan
Hath borne his faculties so meek, hath been
So clear in his great office, that his virtues
Will plead like angels, trumpet-tongued against
The deep damnation of his taking-off,
And Pity, like a naked new-born babe,
Striding the blast, or heaven’s cherubin, horsed
Upon the sightless couriers of the air,
Shall blow the horrid deed in every eye,
That tears shall drown the wind.(ll.16-25)
19 Now his language has become mostly pictorial.  It presents a baroque scenario: angels
blow trumps as in a last day judgement; Pity, personified like the innocent putto typical
of many contemporary paintings and sculptures, rides the blast (possibly, both in the
auditory sense of ‘call’ of a trump, and in the visual sense of wind – often represented
iconographically like a human being9 – ejected by the trumps blown by the angels); Pity is
then followed or substituted by the image of a cherubin horsed on the same blast. Thus
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we have a dynamic,  and at the same time tortuous,  sequence:  virtues,  visualized like
angels, introduce Pity, putto, and cherubin, who in their turn blow, announce, propagate
the regicide, “the horrid deed” about to be done, and thus provoke a universal cry which
“shall drown the wind”. The reader’s or spectator’s response to the entire soliloquy –
which opens on very obscure lines due to the interweaving of different layers of meaning,
and closes with an explosion of overlapping images – may be best summarized by William
Empson’s statement: “The meanings cannot all be remembered at once, however often
you read it; it remains the incantation of a murderer, dishevelled and fumbling among
the powers of darkness.”10
20 I will now turn, albeit briefly, to Leontes’ suddenly conceived jealousy in The Winter’s Tale, 
I.ii. Let us consider ll.136-144, a passage which many critics have regarded as possibly the
most difficult crux in the canon. In fact, Leontes’ elocution is extraordinarily compressed,
and elliptical to the point of allowing quite different emendations and interpretations. I
cannot discuss here all the alternative readings which have been proposed since Rowe’s
edition. In my opinion, however, the Folio reading is substantially correct:
... Can thy Dam, may’t be
Affection? Thy Intention stabs the Center,
Thou do’st make possible things not so held,
Communicat’st with dreams (how can this be?)
With what’s unreall: thou coactive art,
And fellow’st nothing. Then ‘tis very credent,
Thou may’st co-joine with something, and thou do’st,
(And that beyond Commission) and I find it,
(And that to the infection of my Braines,
And hardning of my Browes.)
21 Pope and Johnson followed Rowe in breaking down the enjambement between the first
and the second lines and in substituting Affection with Imagination, and the question mark
with the exclamation mark. The meaning is thus somehow clarified, but also belittled. An
editorial and critical line (Steevens, Malone, etc.) reads Affection as meaning imagination,
even though it rejects Rowe’s emendation. Another critical line, which goes from Capell
to Kermode, reads Affection as the passion of jealousy which is beginning to shake Leontes.
Still  another  line,  more  faithful  to  the  punctuation  of  the  Folio,  refers  Affection to
Hermione (thy dam) and interprets it as “lust”, according to the meaning specified in OED
 3. The next puzzle is constituted by the following Thy intention: Stephen Orgel points out
that “the referent of ‘thy intention’ is unclear, and upon this depends the meaning of the
remainder of the speech;”11 Jean Howard, instead, opts for Leontes’ jealousy: “Passion
(probably the passion of jealousy), your intensity (intention) pierces my heart or to the
core of my being.”12
22 To sum it up, is Leontes referring to Hermione’s passion (love and lust) or to his passion
(jealousy)? The Folio’s reading is not that ambiguous: it is Hermione’s affection. But can
one be sure that  affection here means passion or  even lust?  At  the beginning of  the
narrative source of the play, Greene’s Pandosto, we find both affected and affection referred
to  Bellaria-Hermione,  and  qualified  as  a  lawful  and innocent  feeling.  It  is  a  feeling,
though,  which  the  narrator  ambiguously  brings  the  reader  to  suspect  as  concealing
something more than affection in her relationship with Egistus-Polixenes.13 If we accept
the Folio’s reading, we should imagine that Leontes, soon after mentioning Affection in the
sense of friendly feeling, shifts to the other meaning of passion or lust. This shifting may
be seen in his immediate addressing himself about its dubious significance: “Thy intention
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…”, another complex word, meaning both aiming at something, like in the Latin intendere
(to tend to, to aim at), and intensity. Leontes, therefore, seems to be upset both by the
recipient, his friend Polixenes, to whom Hermione is addressing her affection, and by the
apparent intensity of its manifestation. 
23 In the following lines, Hermione’s passion is seen by him as limitless because it springs
from the deepest layers of her mind. It was there even before finding the recipient on
whom it now discharges itself; it lay in her dreams, in what is unreal. If her passion has
always been there, hidden in her most secret fantasies, it can very well co-joine (another
hapax) with something real – Polixenes at the moment – and thus being coactive, once it
has found its target, it knows no limits: it goes beyond Commission, another strange word
in the context, which seems to mean beyond any lawful authorization of her conscience. 
24 In a few lines of great dramatic intensity, Affection has undergone a radical change, losing
all shade of friendship and turning into passion, which is her imaginary desire hidden in
her breast even before investing itself into a real lover. She is intrinsically unfaithful and
her  affection  amounts  to  the  infection of  Leontes’  brain,  now  working  within  the
imaginary space of frenzied jealousy. Leontes’ elocution-inelocution is that of a speech in
the making, still groping for its own meaning.14
25 2. Jealousy is the realm of the imaginaire. An endogenous obsessive feeling in Leontes, in
Othello it  is  whipped  up  by  Iago  into  the  mind  of  the  Moor.  Thus,  while  Leontes’
inelocution  springs  from  his  interior  monologue-dialogue  which  forces  language  to
ellipses, equivocal expressions, and neologistic or rare linguistic tracks, in Othello other
tricks of language convey an elocution-inelocution by which the imaginary betrayal is
gradually transmitted by Iago to his victim. The great scenes of his temptation are a
triumph of indirectness over directness, of simulacra over signs, of the imaginaire over
the  real.  As  is  well  known,  his  weapons  are  those  of  reticence,  litotes,  negation,
hypothesis, equivoque, and suspension. He says things while pretending that he is not
saying anything. By denying or delaying his own saying, he aims at making Othello think
on and elaborate Desdemona’s betrayal. Pretty early in the first long scene (III.iii), Othello
begs him to show his thought and soon afterwards to speak it out:
I prithee speak to me as to thy thinkings,
As thou dost ruminate, and give thy worst of thoughts 
The worst of words. (III.iii.134-36)
26 Iago’s reply is a masterpiece of rhetoric, in which he conveys a puritan representation of
anybody’s possibly vile psychic depths. Anybody includes himself, but at the same time,
through an indirect suggestion, hints at Desdemona, whose pure breast may not be what
it claims to be: 
Good my lord, pardon me;
Though I am bound to every act of duty
I am not bound to that all slaves are free to –
Utter my thoughts? Why, say they are vile and false?
As where’s that palace whereinto foul things
Sometimes intrude not? Who has a breast so pure
But some uncleanly apprehensions
Keep leets and law-days and in session sit
With meditations lawful? (III.iii.136-44: my italics)
27 He starts by addressing the Moor as a slave would his master, a relationship he is about to
invert, as Othello’s use of the same verb of submission proves in l.217: “I am bound to thee
for  ever.”  Then he unfolds  the  pregnant  image of  foul  things intruding even upon a
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sumptuous palace. The verb to intrude suggests the creeping of repellent animals into
cellars or dungeons. A second, court of law, image follows to show the inner trial which
takes place in any breast,  even the supposedly pure, when the unclean apprehension
clashes with the lawful meditation. He is impudently drawing a faithful self-portrait, as of
a person hiding unavowable sins, a portrait which, in his next speech, he soon qualifies as
that of a person whose excessive zeal goes haunting human vices even where they are not:
“As I confess it is my nature’s plague / To spy into abuses, and oft my jealousy / Shapes
faults  that  are  not”  (ll.149-51).  Why  is  he  taking  the  risk  of  exposing  himself?  His
intention is clearly that of putting the stress on foul, unclean, and abuse, the words for the
vices of which Desdemona must be found guilty,  and to name for the first time in a
displaced sense (that of zeal, the puritan attitude that denounced any kind of abuse) the
key word jealousy, which Othello is called to elaborate on.
28 To do so Othello must be left alone for a moment. And this is what Iago soon arranges. He
pretends to go away and thus leaves the Moor to think on his own. Othello starts by
reassuring himself of the honesty of Iago (“This fellow’s of exceeding honesty…”); then he
decides that, if Desdemona is false to him, he will let her fly away like a haggard (the first
animalesque image of Iago’s repertoire to invade his mind); he further regrets his being
black, uncultivated and old, and curses the institution of marriage which does not ensure
faithfulness because the appetites of women may always draw them to others: “O curse of
marriage / That we can call these delicate creatures ours / And not their appetites!” A
key-word of Iago’s imagination, the female appetite,  has infected his mind. And to the
same effect other images worked out by Iago have contributed, as can be seen in the
following lines:
… I had rather be a toad 
And live upon the vapour of a dungeon 
Than keep a corner in the thing I love 
For others’ uses. (ll.274-77)
29 The repellent animal in a dungeon – a place which appears to be a metaphor for what is
secret and hidden – echoes Iago’s words at ll.140-44 (“As where’s that palace whereinto
foul things / Sometimes intrude not?”): toad visualizes foul things, while dungeon identifies
the plausibly subterranean hidden place alluded to by Iago. To be explicit, what is hidden
is sex, and more precisely the vagina (“the thing I love”), in which Othello now refuses the
very idea of keeping a corner:  a corner in the poky space now allowed to him in her
otherwise bounteous sex open to many.15 His mind is upset and his new vulgar language
brings him to the very place where betrayal is supposed to happen. 
30 To that place he will obsessively return later in the play, when he accuses Desdemona in
IV.ii.58-63: 
But there where I have garnered up my heart,
Where either I must live, or bear no life,
The fountain from the which my current runs 
Or else dries up – to be discarded thence! 
Or keep it as a cistern for foul toads
To knot and gender in!16
31 The beneficial stream of his life, which flew from Desdemona, has come to a stop since he
has been excluded from it. That “fountain” has been degraded by her betrayal to still
water in a cistern (which echoes the dungeon of his previous disgusted complaint). Far
from even keeping a corner in it, he now regards it as a place only fit for toads, Desdemona
and her lover knotting in the dark water. To his mind the sublime Desdemona has become
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a thing, a dungeon, a cistern, all of them metaphors for the vagina, caught as he is in a
hectic crowd of sexual images. 
32 Othello  is  lost  in  his  folly.  To  reach  this  point,  he  has  had  to  undergo  an  utter
fragmentation of his conscience. This has happened at the beginning of Act IV. Iago has
insisted that he should think: l.1 “Will you think so?” What should he think of? Iago soon
provides  him  with  the  object  of  thinking:  he  must  think  of  kisses,  of  Cassio  and
Desdemona naked in bed but meaning no harm, of what Cassio has disclosed to Iago. What
has  Cassio  said?  As  usual,  Iago  works  on reticence.  “Lie–”,  he  answers.  “With  her?”
Othello plies him. “With her, on her, what you will” is the cruel reply which allows the
victim to choose the way in which he prefers to imagine the sexual scene. Othello, of
course, knows that Lie has a double meaning – to couch and to tell lies – and tries for a
moment to disentangle the sense. But he soon suffers from a hallucination which forbids
his  discourse  to  flow  any  longer  and,  before  swooning,  he  disintegrates  his  usually
hyperbolic verse into a broken prose: 
Lie  with her? lie on her? We say lie  on her when they belie  her!  Lie  with her,
zounds, that’s fulsome! – Handcherchief! Confessions! handcherchief! – To confess
and be hanged for his labour! First to be hanged, and then to confess: I tremble at it.
Nature  would  not  invest herself  in  such  shadowing  passion  without  some
instruction.  It  is  not words that shakes me thus.  Pish!  Noses,  ears,  and lips.  Is’t
possible? Confess! Handcherchief! O devil! (35-43)
33 His language is reduced to the fragments of the fabula invented by Iago. The two main
proofs which have been produced – the handkerchief and Cassio’s alleged confession – are
recalled  by  him  without  verbs  or  qualifications:  “Handkerchief  –  confessions  –
handkerchief!” For a moment, in his fury against Cassio, he seems to recollect himself:
first he wants him dead, then he argues on the mystery of Nature which cannot go astray
with passion unless it receives some instruction. But which passion is he speaking of? Is it
his own darkening passion or Desdemona’s passion? Possibly both within his distraught
mind. But who is the instructor? If it is Desdemona’s passion, the instructor should be the
perverse nature of women which has resurfaced in her.  If  it  is  Othello’s passion,  the
instructor must be somebody who has taught him how to feel such a passion. But he
disowns this correct hint: “It is not words that shakes me thus,” that is, Iago’s words
which  have  worked  him  up  to  this  point!  By  this  denial  –  an  extreme  refusal  to
acknowledge an external agent for his turmoil – he confirms his passion as the result of
his  own discovery  of  the  betrayal.  And  then  he  loses  all  trace  of  self-control:  only
fragments of bodies, synecdoches of a sexual scene, swirl in his mind: “Pish! Noses, ears,
and lips.” There is only the time to articulate once again the required revelation of the sin
(Confess!) and the “ocular proof” of it (Handkerchief!), and he swoons. Shakespeare’s poetry
of action reaches here the silence of an inert body. Elocution and inelocution plunge into
the abyss where language is denied.
34 3. I will now turn to the Sonnets, whose poetry, while belonging to the lyrical genre, is still
essentially dramatic and circumstantial.  The poet always refers to somebody (the fair
youth, the dark lady, Time itself in the immortality sonnets, etc.), or addressing himself
in interior dialogues. I shall concentrate on the last sonnets of the sequence to the fair
friend (numbers 121-125). With the exclusion of sonnet 122, these poems constitute, in
my opinion, an interrelated microsequence which adds to the meaning of each one. 
35 Let us start from sonnet 123:
No, Time, thou shalt not boast that I do change!
Thy pyramids built up with newer might
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To me are nothing novel, nothing strange;
They are but dressings of a former sight.
Our dates are brief, and therefore we admire
What thou dost foist upon us that is old,
And rather make them born to our desire
Than think that we before have heard them told.
Thy registers and thee I both defy,
Not wondering at the present nor the past;
For thy records and what we see doth lie,
Made more or less by thy continual haste.
This I do vow, and this shall ever be:
I will be true despite thy scythe and thee.
36 Up to this moment, the protagonist elected by the poet to struggle against Time had
always been his friend, whose perfect Image had been celebrated as an archetype, living
in time but overcoming time, age, and death. In this sonnet, instead, the poet affirms his
own  immutability  in  a  great  challenge  to  Time,  while  not  aspiring  however  to
immortality: rather, he opposes to the fickleness of Time, to its tricks, shows, and lies, the
truth of his unchanging identity. Behind Time it is possible to infer the presence of other
addressees: a person (or more than one) who might have put the poet’s truth in doubt. In
his coherence and honesty, and most of all – as we shall see – in his unselfishness, he
strongly refuses any charge of inconsistency and instrumental expediency. False, on the
contrary, is Time in its institutional mutability; and false are those who lay traps on the
poet. 
37 This interpretation needs to be supported by the context in which the sonnet is placed.
Before examining the following two pieces, 124 and 125, it seems convenient to look at
sonnet 121, a poem dealing in general terms with the problem of private morality and the
way it is publicly regarded through distortions and malign projections: 
’Tis better to be vile than vile esteemed
When not to be receives reproach of being,
And the just pleasure lost, which is so deemed,
Not by our feeling but by others’ seeing.
For why should others’ false adulterate eyes
Give salutation to my sportive blood?
Or on my frailties why are frailer spies,
Which in their wills count bad what I think good?
No, I am that I am, and they that level
At my abuses reckon up their own.
I may be straight though they themselves be bevel;
By their rank thoughts my deeds must not be shown,
Unless this general evil they maintain
All men are bad and in their badness reign.
38 The poem starts with an impersonal statement which soon involves a circumstantially
personal indignation. The poet rebels against those who obliquely censure his sensual
behaviour by looking at him, the ‘culprit’, with false adulterate eyes: malign persons (spies)
who presume to be the keepers of an absolute morality, but, in fact, project their own
vices  onto  the  poet.  It  is  the  same  psychic  mechanism  which  is  at  work  in  Iago’s
projection of his obscene thoughts onto Othello (and Roderigo and Cassio). Faced with the
devious attack of such an attitude, the poet asserts his undisputable authenticity with
words that  reproduce Jahve’s  declaration to  Moses:  “I  am that  I  am”:  an apparently
blasphemous assumption which conflicts with the machiavellian one uttered by Iago in
the first scene of the tragedy, where he reassures Roderigo that he is going to cheat the
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odious Moor. “In following him, I follow but myself,” he says, and then concludes his
speech: 
For when my outward action does demonstrate
The native act, and figure of my heart,
In complement extern, ‘tis not long after,
But I will wear my heart upon my sleeve,
For doves to peck at: I am not what I am. (ll.61-65: my italics)
39 The first  two italics  should  be  kept  in  mind when I  read sonnet  125.  An intriguing
relationship between this group of sonnets, starting with this one, and Othello has been
pinpointed by some critics.17 Moreover, line 7 – “frailer spies”– and ll. 9-10 – “they that
level / At my abuses” – also echo Iago’s words quoted above (“As I confess it is my nature’s
plague / To spy into abuses,” Othello, III.iii.149-51). 
40 Let us now consider sonnet 124:
If my dear love were but the child of state,
It might for Fortune’s bastard be unfathered,
As subject to Time’s love, or to Time’s hate,
Weeds among weeds, or flowers with flowers gathered.
No, it was builded far from accident;
It suffers not in smiling pomp, nor falls
Under the blow of thrallèd discontent,
Whereto th’inviting time our fashion calls.
It fears not policy, that heretic
Which works on leases of short-numbered hours,
But all alone stands hugely politic,
That it nor grows with heat, nor drowns with showers.
To this I witness call the fools of Time,
Which die for goodness, who have lived for crime.
41 Taken by itself, this is a very evasive poem. Stephen Booth has regarded it as “the most
extreme  example  of  Shakespeare’s  constructive  vagueness.”18 In  the  context  of  the
microsequence, though, it acquires a much clearer meaning. In this sonnet, too, the poet
rebels against a judgement, or better an insinuation, which would bring his patron (“my
dear love”, l.1) to suspect that his affection is an opportunistic one. Somebody – a spy, as
suggested in sonnet 121, or explicitly the suborned informer we shall meet at the end of the
following sonnet – is the false source of such a deception. The milieu, as Booth has noted
with reference to sonnet 121, is that of “the ceremony, hypocrisy, backbiting and gossip
of courtiers,”19 and is here signified by a revealing chain of expressions like child of state, 
smiling pomp, thralled discontent, inviting time, policy. The poet opposes his truth to it by
always  starting  with  the  absolute  negation  No,  which  testifies  to  his  extraordinary
assertiveness in all these sonnets – 121, l.9, “No, I am that I am”; 123, l.11, “No, Time, thou
shalt not boast”; 24, 5,  “No, it was builded far from accident”; 125, 9,  “No, let me be
obsequious in thy heart.”20 
42 Sonnet 125 concludes the elusive “story”: 
Were’t aught to me I bore the canopy,
With my extern the outward honouring,
Or laid great bases for eternity,
Which proves more short than waste or ruining?
Have I not seen dwellers on form and favour
Lose all and more by paying too much rent,
For compound sweet forgoing simple savour,
Pitiful thrivers in their gazing spent?
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No, let me be obsequious in thy heart,
And take thou my oblation, poor but free,
Which is not mixed with seconds, knows no art
But mutual render, only me for thee.
Hence, thou suborned informer! A true soul
When most impeached stands least in thy control.
43 A link with the previous sonnet has been noted by various critics.21 The first two lines
take up the theme dealt with at the opening of the previous sonnet: the poet’s love is not
opportunistic and servile. Were it so, he might undergo a degradation such as the one
suffered by “Pitiful thrivers in their gazing spent” (l.5-8) – a destiny analogous to that of
sonnet 124, l.2. But what is most interesting here is the parallelism with Iago’s speech in I
.i.61-65 quoted above, where he boasts of his ability to simulate and dissimulate his own
intentions and his “outward action,” so that his “native act,” i.e. the “figure” of his heart,
will never be revealed in “complement extern.” Both outward and extern recur here in the
substantive form – and it  should be noted that they are the only occurrences in the
canon. A peculiar relationship between the tragedy of Othello and this group of sonnets
emerges once again, and is confirmed by the striking conclusion of this sonnet which
ends the whole sequence devoted to the poet’s friend. To him, for the first and only time
in this microsequence, the poet finally addresses himself in l.9-12 asserting that his love
knows no other motive than mutual render. 
44 In the couplet the addressee changes all of a sudden with a strong dramatic effect. The
spy, the slanderer, up till now only obliquely hinted at in sonnets 121 and 124, appears on
the stage, but only to be ousted thence by the true soul of the poet, who is not an Othello
ensnared  in  the  deception  of  a  Iago!  That  deception,  though,  might  have  been
unintentionally prompted by the suspicion raised in the poet’s patron, as suborned seems
to imply. What is sure, anyhow, is that, as Kerrigan has observed in a note to sonnet 124,
“In this last group of sonnets to the youth […] writing yields in strength to emotion, verbs
of making are given over […] and sonneteering becomes less sufficient.”22
45 Drama comes to the fore. The close of the sequence is perhaps the most striking example
of a scenic language in Shakespeare’s lyrical poetry. One which is, in most cases, in action,
in that it relies on relationships, accidents, events (however elliptically presented they
may be), and on the ever-changing moods and frames of mind which mirror a newly
relativistic cultural-historical context. 
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1.  The quotation is drawn from The Romantics on Shakespeare, ed. Jonathan Bate, Harmondsworth,
Penguin  Books,  1992,  162-63;  the  reference  is  to Specimens  of  the  Table  Talk  of  Samuel  Taylor
Coleridge, 2 vols, ed. H. N. Coleridge (2nd ed., London, 1836), 7 April 1833 and 5 March 1834.
2.  Still in regard to Shakespeare’s language, he writes on another occasion: “…in many instances,
the predominance of some mighty Passion takes the place of the guiding Thought, and the result
presents the method of Nature, rather than the habit of the Individual. For Thought, Imagination
(and  we  may  add,  Passion),  are,  in  their  very  essence,  the  first,  connective,  the  latter  co-
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future! However, to be and to end are antithetical, they can only contradict each other […] The
act of murder cannot be an end; nothing in time can, in that sense, be ‘done’” (Op. cit., 208-9).
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“Translating Shakespeare: a Brief Survey of some Problematic Areas”, Translating Shakespeare in
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York, 2004, 38-41.
9.  As Nicholas Brooke has noted in his edition of the play, Oxford, New York, O.U.P., 1994, 118. 
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loved  her  husband  by  his  friend’s  entertainment,  used  him  likewise  so  familiarly  that  her
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increased  daily  more  and  more  betwixt  them […]  there  grew such  a  secret  uniting  of  their
affections, that the one could not well be without the company of the other [...] He [Pandosto-
Leontes]  then  began  to  measure  all  their  actions,  and  [to]  misconstrue  of  their  private
familiarity, judging that it was not for honest affection, but for disordinate fancy, so as he began
to watch them more narrowly…” (my italics).
14.  I  have  given  a  more  detailed  analysis  of  this  scene  in  an  essay,  “Translation  and
Performance”, in Shifting the Scene. Shakespeare in European Culture, Ladina Bezzola Lambert and
Balz Engler (eds), University of Delaware Press, Newark, 2004, 275-79.
15.  Starting from this point of the play, Patricia Parker notes a concentration of language on
“the ‘privities’  of  woman” (“Fantasies  of  ‘Race’  and ‘Gender’:  Africa,  Othello,  and Bringing to
Light”, in  Hendricks  and  Parker  (eds),  Women,  “Race”,  and  Writing  in  the  Early  Modern  Period,
NewYork and London, Routledge, 1993, 87). For a diffuse playful exploitation of the theme of the
vagina’s bounteousness see the Will sonnets, 135 and 136. 
16.  For a similar use of cistern as the place of uncontrolled lust see Malcolm’s speech in Macbeth, 
IV.iii.60-63: “But there’s no bottom, none, / In my voluptuousness. Your wives, your daughters, /
Your matrons,  and your maids,  could not fill  up / The cistern of my lust…”; and Cleopatra’s
speech  in  Antony  and  Cleopatra,  II.v.93-5:  “O,  I  would  thou  didst,  /  So  half  my  Egypt  were
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1986, 342. 
18.  Stephen Booth, Shakespeare’s Sonnets, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1977,
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19.  Op. cit., 409.
20.  No occurs only six times in the canon, four of which are found in this group of sonnets. 
21.  See John Kerrigan for instance: “The poet responds to the criticism of an onlooker (perhaps
one of those described in Sonnet 121) who has apparently suggested that his love is just the child of
state (124.1), by insisting that he recognizes the vanity of pomp and circumstance and has been
impressed in the past by the folly of those seduced by appearances” (Op. cit., 348). 
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ABSTRACTS
Drawing  from  my  experience  as  a  critic-translator,  I  will  investigate  some  of  Shakespeare’s
distinctive ways of creating poetry in action: that is, at the same time, poetry developing in a
staged context and therefore endowed with a performative power, and poetry growing out of a
dialectics between passion and thought. Whether the text is a play or a narrative poem, or a
sonnet  –  though  in  the  latter  cases  through  different  modes  of  expression  –,  Shakespeare’s
poetry always conveys the process of minds in situation.
Puisant dans mon expérience de critique-traducteur, je m’attacherai à sonder certaines façons
caractéristiques dont Shakespeare crée la poésie en action : à savoir, à la fois, la poésie qui se
construit  dans  un  contexte  de  mise  en  scène  et  par  conséquent  dotée  d’une  puissance
performative, et la poésie qui est le fruit d’une dialectique entre passion et pensée. Que le texte
soit une pièce ou un poème narratif, ou encore un sonnet (bien que dans ces derniers cas les
modes d’expression soient différents), la poésie de Shakespeare véhicule toujours le processus
d’esprits en situation.
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